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BEYOND THE DOCTRINE: FIVE QUESTIONS THAT
WILL DETERMINE THE ACA'S CONSTITUTIONAL
FATE
Bradley W. Joondeph *
The litigation challenging the constitutionality of the Patient
Protection and Affordable Care Act ("ACA" or "Act") raises a
number of interesting and important questions of constitutional
law. But in cases of this magnitude and political salience, the Supreme Court's deliberations typically are shaped by forces that
transcend the relevant doctrine. The Court's response to the ACA
is unlikely to be an exception. Specifically, the Justices' reactions
to five questions-all of which go beyond the doctrinal meritswill likely determine the Act's fate: (1) whether this is the sort of
case in which judicial review is necessary, or instead one that the
elected branches are capable of solving on their own; (2) whether
the states are "separately incompetent" to reform the nation's
health care financing system, such that invalidating the Act will
leave a policy void (and whether the existence of such a void
should matter); (3) whether Congress's power to adopt a more
radical, single-payer-type system for all Americans should inform
whether Congress has the authority to adopt the more incremental ACA; (4) whether the Court can invalidate the ACA, especially
with an ideologically predictable 5-4 split, without appearing
overly partisan to the American public; and (5) how Chief Justice
Roberts will perceive the impact of this case on his legacy-as an
opportunity to reaffirm the singular importance of judicial restraint, or as an instance where the Court's intervention is necessary to preserve foundational principles. Each of these considera-

* Professor, Santa Clara University School of Law. J.D., 1994, Stanford University;
B.A., 1990, Stanford University. I am grateful to the University of Richmond School of
Law, and particularly Professor Kevin Walsh, for the opportunity to participate in the
2011 Allen Chair Health Care Symposium, and to David Ball, Deep Gulasekaram, David
Hasen, Timothy Jost, Michelle Oberman, Ilya Shapiro, David Sloss, and Ilya Somin for
their very helpful comments on earlier drafts. I owe thanks to Brandon Douglass and Jennifer McAllister for their terrific research assistance.
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tions extends beyond the precise constitutional questions presented. But in a case such as this, it is the Justices' reactions to
these broader questions that tend to drive their doctrinal analysis, rather than the other way around.
I. DOCTRINAL PUZZLES

Since it was signed into law on March 23, 20 10,' roughly thirty
lawsuits challenging the constitutionality of the ACA 2 have been
filed in federal court.' These suits have raised a broad array of
constitutional claims, from whether the ACA infringes on the
constitutional right to privacy,' to whether it interferes with the

1. See Sheryl Gay Stolberg & Robert Pear, A Stroke of a Pen, Make That 20, and It's
Official, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 24, 2010, at A19.
2. Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, Pub. L. No. 111-148, 124 Stat. 119
(2010) (codified in scattered sections of 21, 25, 26, 29, and 42 U.S.C.), amended by Health
Care and Education Reconciliation Act of 2010, Pub. L. No. 111-152, 124 Stat. 1029 (codified in scattered sections of 26, and 42 U.S.C.).
3. See, e.g., Virginia ex rel. Cuccinelli v. Sebelius, 656 F.3d 253 (4th Cir. 2011); Liberty Univ., Inc. v. Geithner, _ F.3d _, 2011 WL 3962915 (4th Cir. Sep. 8, 2011); Florida
ex rel. Attorney Gen. v. U.S. Dep't of Health & Human Servs., 648 F.3d 1235 (11th Cir.
2011); Baldwin v. Sebelius, 654 F.3d 877 (9th Cir. 2011); N.J. Physicians, Inc. v. President
of the United States, 653 F.3d 234 (3d Cir. 2011); Thomas More Law Ctr. v. Obama, 651
F.3d 529 (6th Cir. 2011); Goudy-Bachman v. U.S. Dep't of Health & Human Servs., _ F.
Supp. 2d _, 2011 WL 4072875 (M.D. Pa Sep. 13, 2011); Kinder v. Geithner, No. 1:10 CV
101, 2011 WL 1576721 (E.D. Mo. Apr. 26, 2011); Calvey v. Obama, 792 F. Supp. 2d 1262
(W.D. Okla. 2011); Purpura v. Sebelius, No. 10-04814, 2011 WL 15477568 (D.N.J. Apr. 21,
2011); Physician Hosps. of Am. v. Sebelius, 781 F. Supp. 2d 431 (E.D. Tex. 2011); Peterson
v. United States, 774 F. Supp. 2d 418 (D.N.H. 2011); Bellow v. U.S. Dep't of Human
Health & Human Servs., 2011 WL 2470456 (E.D. Tex. 2011); Mead v. Holder, 766 F. Supp.
2d 16 (D.D.C. 2011); Bryant v. Holder, No. 2:10 CV 76, 2011 WL 710693 (S.D. Miss. Feb. 3,
2011); U.S. Citizens Ass'n v. Sebelius, 754 F. Supp. 2d 903 (N.D. Ohio 2010); Anderson v.

Obama, No. PJM 10-7, 2010 WL 3000765 (D. Md. July 28, 2010); Complaint Re Section
1501, Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, Boyle v. Sebelius, No. 2:11-cv-07868
(C.D. Fla. Sept. 26, 2011); Second Amended Civil Rights Complaint for Declaratory and
Injunctive Relief, Coons v. Geithner, No. 2:10-cv-1714 (D. Ariz. May 10, 2011) [hereinafter
Second Amended Civil Rights Complaint, Coons]; Second Amended Petition for Injunctive
and Declaratory Relief, Bryant v. Holder, No. 2:10-cv-76 (S.D. Miss. Mar. 4, 2011), E.C.F.
No. 27 [hereinafter Second Amended Petition, Bryant]; Complaint for Declaratory and Injunctive Relief, Oklahoma ex rel. Pruitt v. Sebelius, No. 6:2011-cv-00030 (E.D. Okla. Jan.
21, 2011) [hereinafter Complaint, Oklahoma ex rel. Pruitt]; Class Action Complaint for
Declaratory and Injunctive Relief, Independent American Party of Nevada v. Obama, No.
2:10-cv-1477 (D. Nev. Aug. 31, 2010); Complaint for Declaratory Judgment and Injunctive
Relief, Sissel v. U.S. Dep't of Health & Human Servs., No. 1:10-cv-01 2 63 (D.D.C. July 26,
2010); Judgment, Mackenzie v. Shaheen, No. 10-cv-167 (D.N.H. May 26, 2010); Class Ac-

tion Petition for Injunctive and Declaratory Relief, Bullworth v. Holder, No. 4:10-cv-00258
(E.D. Ark. Apr. 27, 2010), 2010 WL 3229808; Complaint, Fountain Hills Tea Party Patriots v. Sebelius, No. 2:2010-cv-00893 (D. Ariz. Apr. 22, 2010).
4. See Second Amended Petition, Bryant, supra note 3, at 34-35.
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free exercise of religion,5 to whether it violates the Thirteenth
Amendment's prohibition on slavery.' Most of these arguments
have little chance of success; governing law is too much of a barrier. But at least two claims are clearly plausible, and thus raise
the specter of the Supreme Court invalidating some of the Act's
central provisions-or even declaring the entire ACA unenforceable (if the Court additionally finds that the unconstitutional parts
of the Act cannot be severed from what remains).'
The first plausible claim, and the one the Court will take up in
U.S. Department of Health & Human Services v. Florida,' is that
the ACA's minimum essential coverage provision (also known as
the "individual mandate")-which requires most Americans to
acquire health insurance by January 2014, or instead pay a penalty to be included on their federal income tax return9-exceeds
Congress's enumerated powers."o To date, three district courts
and one court of appeals have held this aspect of the ACA unconstitutional." The second, which the Court will review in Floridav.
U.S. Departmentof Health & Human Services," is that the ACA's
amendments to Medicaid-which, among other things, require
participating states to extend coverage to all adults with incomes
up to 138% of the federal poverty level"-effect a financial inducement that is "so massive as to leave States with no choice but

5. See Complaint at 12, Thomas More Law Ctr. v. Obama, No. 2:10-cv-11156 (E.D.
Mich. Mar. 23, 2010) [hereinafter Complaint, Thomas More Law Cirl.
6. See Request for Declaratory Judgment at 5, 24-25, Purpura v. Sebelius, No. 3:10cv-04814 (D.N.J. Sept. 20, 2010).
7. See Florida ex rel. Bondi, 780 F. Supp. 2d at 1298-99, 1305-06 (holding that the
minimum essential coverage provision exceeded Congress's enumerated powers and because that provision was so central to the functioning of the legislation, the entire ACA
was void and unenforceable).
8. U.S. Dep't of Health & Human Servs. v. Florida, _ U.S. _, cert. granted, 132
S. Ct. 604 (2011).
9. See 26 U.S.C. § 5000A (Supp. IV 2010).
10. Virtually every lawsuit challenging the ACA's constitutionality has raised this
claim. See, e.g., Virginia ex rel. Cuccinelli v. Sebelius, 702 F. Supp. 2d 598, 601 (E.D. Va.
2010), vacated, 656 F.3d 253, 266 (4th Cir. 2011).
11. See, e.g., Florida ex rel. Attorney Gen. v. U.S. Dep't of Health & Human Servs.,
648 F.3d 1235, 1328 (11th Cir. 2011); Goudy-Bachman v. U.S. Dep't of Health & Human
Servs., No. 1:10-cv-763,
F. Supp. 2d _,
2011 WL 4072875, at *21 (M.D. Pa. Sept. 13,
2011); Virginia ex rel. Cuccinelli, 728 F. Supp. 2d at 788.
12. Florida v. U.S. Dep't of Health & Human Servs., 132 S. Ct. 604 (order granting
petition for writ of certiorari).
13. See Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, 42 U.S.C. § 1396a(a)(1) (Supp. IV
2010), amended by Health Care and Education Reconciliation Act, Pub. L. No. 111-152, §
1004, 124 Stat. 1034 (2010) (codified in scattered sections of 26 and 42 U.S.C.).
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to accept it," passing "the point at which pressure turns into compulsion [to] achieve[] forbidden direct regulation of the States." 4
The Eleventh Circuit is the only court of appeals to have reached
this second question, and it upheld the ACA's Medicaid provisions
unanimously.
Constitutional litigation is often "a continuation of policy by
other means," 6 and the ACA litigation is no exception. It is hardly
a coincidence that the leading plaintiffs in some of the highprofile lawsuits are prominent Republicans-governors," state attorneys general," and members of Congress"-or that hundreds
of elected officials (including Senate Majority Leader Harry Reid
and Speaker of the House John Boehner) have filed several amicus curiae briefs. 20 But the constitutional questions these cases

14.

Petition for a Writ of Certiorari, Florida ex rel. Attorney Gen. v. U.S. Dep't of

Health & Human Servs., No. 11-400 (Sept. 27, 2011) [hereinafter Petition, Florida ex rel.
Attorney Gen.]. The federal government will fund most of this coverage expansion, but not
all of it. See Health Care and Education Reconciliation Act, 42 U.S.C. § 1396(d) (Supp. IV
2010). Thus, the ACA will substantially increase the minimum cost to a participating
state.
15. See Floridaex rel. Attorney Gen., 648 F.3d at 1263-68. Despite the fact this issue
was not raised in any of the other lawsuits, the Court will hear an hour of oral argument
on this issue. Lyle Denniston, Analysis: Health Care's Medicaid Expansion, SCOTUSBLOG

(Dec. 27, 2011, 12:28 AM), http://www.scotusblog.com/2011/12/analysis-health-cares-medi
caid-expansion ("The Obama Administration ... sought to head off Supreme Court review,
relying on.. . the reasoning of the Eleventh Circuit when it found the theory wanting.").
16. With apologies to Carl von Clausewitz. See 1 CARL VON CLAUSEWITZ, ON WAR 23
(F.N. Maude ed., J.J. Graham trans., 1966) ("War is a mere continuation of policy by other
means.").
17. See Petition, Floridaex rel. Attorney Gen., supra note 14, at i-iii (listing six governors who are plaintiffs in the Florida litigation).
18. See id. at ii (listing the twenty-two state attorneys general as parties to the Florida litigation); Petition for a Writ of Certiorari at 1, Virginia ex rel. Cuccinelli v. Sebelius,
No. 11-420 (Sept. 30, 2011) (lawsuit brought by Virginia Attorney General Kenneth Cuccinelli); Complaint, Oklahoma ex rel. Pruitt, supra note 3, at 2 (lawsuit brought by Oklahoma Attorney General Scott Pruitt).

19.

See Second Amended Civil Rights Complaint, Bryant, supra note 3 (plaintiffs in-

clude Jeff Flake and Trent Franks, both United States Representatives from the State of
Arizona).
20. See, e.g., Brief for the Family Research Council and 30 Members of the U.S. House
of Representatives as Amici Curiae Supporting Petitioners app. at la, Nat'l Fed'n of Indep.
Bus. v. Sebelius, Nos. 11-393 & 11-400 (11th Cir. Oct. 27, 2011); Brief for the American
Center for Law & Justice et al. as Amici Curiae Supporting Petitioners at 2-3, Florida ex
rel. Attorney Gen. v. U.S. Dep't of Health & Human Servs., No. 11-400 (11th Cir. Oct. 26,
2011) (certiorari stage brief on behalf of 105 members of Congress); Brief for Senate Majority Leader Harry Reid et al. as Amici Curiae Supporting Appellants, Florida ex rel. Attorney Gen. v. U.S. Dep't of Health & Human Servs., Nos. 11-11021 & 11-11067 (11th Cir.
Apr. 11, 2011); Brief for Members of the United States Senate and Speaker of the House
John Boehner as Amici Curiae Supporting Plaintiffs-Appellees, Florida ex rel. Attorney
Gen. v. U.S. Dep't of Health & Human Servs., No. 11-11021 (11th Cir. May 12, 2011).

HeinOnline -- 46 U. Rich. L. Rev. 766 2011-2012

2012]

THE ACA'S FATE

767

raise are not purely political. Rather, the challengers' two principal claims pose a welter of intricate and important doctrinal puzzles, the resolution of which is important in its own right. Consider the following questions concerning the constitutionality of the
minimum essential coverage provision:
Exactly how does one define the conduct that a specific
federal statutory provision regulates? Is the inquiry confined to the precise subsection being challenged (in this
case, 26 U.S.C. § 5000(a))? Or might the regulated activity be conceived more broadly, such that the challenged
subsection is properly seen as a means of reaching the
activity the statute seeks to regulate?
More concretely, does the individual mandate regulate
an individual's choice between purchasing health insurance and remaining idle? Or does it regulate the choice
between obtaining health care services with or without
adequate coverage? Congress can forbid health care providers from offering services to those who lack adequate
insurance; this is commercial activity. Can Congress effectively do the same, albeit indirectly, by requiring everyone to acquire coverage in advance? Stated differently,
does the minimum essential coverage provision regulate
the health insurance market (a market in which only
some Americans participate), or instead the market for
health care services (a market in which essentially everyone participates)?
More abstractly, for purposes of construing Congress's
enumerated powers, how do we differentiate (a) Congress's selection of particular legislative means (which,
dating to McCulloch v. Maryland, have traditionally
triggered very deferential judicial scrutiny2 1 ) from (b)
Congress's regulatory objectives? At what point do legislative means become ends in themselves, subject to more
searching judicial review?

21. 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316, 323-25 (1819); see also United States v. Comstock, 560
U.S. 1, 7 (2010) (The Constitution '"addresse[s]' the 'choice of means' 'primarily ... to the
judgment of Congress' (quoting Burroughs v. United States, 290 U.S. 534, 547-48
(1934))).
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If the minimum essential coverage provision, best understood, regulates the decision whether to purchase health
insurance, is a person's decision not to acquire coverage
properly conceptualized as "passive inactivity"? Or is no
one truly "inactive" with respect to the financing of
health care, such that every individual is making a decision (and an economic one at that) as to how to pay for
the care they almost assuredly will need at some point?
If the individual mandate indeed regulates "passive inactivity," can Congress ever extend its commerce power so
far without obliterating the foundational principle that
the national government is one of limited and enumerated powers? Or is the activity/inactivity distinction no
more promising than other distinctions the Court has
drawn and later discarded as unworkable, such as that
between "commerce" and "manufacturing," or between
"direct" and "indirect" effects?
Finally, if Congress is constitutionally prohibited from
regulating "passive inactivity"-at least when regulating
interstate commerce-what is the textual, constitutional
basis for that limit? And how can we square such a constraint with the various federal statutes that (uncontroversially) do the same in the service of other enumerated
powers-for instance, federal laws that compel service in
the military, service on juries, and selling property that
has been seized by the government through the power of
eminent domain?
With respect to the ACA's expansion of Medicaid, consider
these questions:
Can the financial inducement that Congress offers state
governments as part of a federal spending program-a
program in which the states' participation remains formally voluntary-ever be so powerful as to constitute
''coercion"?
If so, how do we define "coercion" in this context, where
the states (a) have no pre-existing constitutional entitlement to any federal funding, (b) possess an independent
taxing power, and (c) are sophisticated entities rather
than natural persons who might be vulnerable to various
psychological pressures?
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Is there a judicially manageable standard for defining
such coercion? Does it depend on the sheer volume of dollars at stake, the proportion of the state's budget affected, or something else? Can it depend on the proportionality of the financial sanction to the gravity of the state's
noncompliance? How should we account for a state's decision to become more or less dependent on federal largesse? Would the same spending program be constitutional as applied to some states but not to others?
Does it matter whether the new spending conditions apply to pre-existing streams of federal financial assistance? If so, would such a rule effectively preclude Congress from making any significant changes to joint
federal-state spending programs (short of repealing and
re-enacting the programs in their entirety)?
These lines of inquiry are hardly exhaustive. Indeed, they omit
the many thorny questions surrounding some other significant issues-namely, (1) whether, setting aside the Commerce Clause,
the individual mandate (and its accompanying tax penalty) might
be justified as a valid exercise of Congress's taxing power;22 (2)
whether the challenge to the ACA on the ground that it exceeds
Congress's enumerated powers must be assessed facially-as either within or outside Congress's legislative authority-or instead is amenable to challenges by particular plaintiffs on an asapplied basis;" (3) whether, if the individual mandate is unconstitutional, it can be severed from some or all of the Act's hundreds
of remaining provisions;" and (4) whether the case's jurisdictional
complications (both statutory and constitutional) might preclude
the Supreme Court from even reaching the merits.25

22. See, e.g., Virginia ex rel. Cuccinelli v. Sebelius, 728 F. Supp. 2d 768, 782-87 (E.D.
Va. 2010) (concluding that the individual mandate is not a bona fide revenue-raising
measure enacted under the taxing power of Congress), vacated, 656 F.3d 253, 266 (4th Cir.
2011).
23. See, e.g., Thomas More Law Ctr. v. Obama, 651 F.3d 529, 554-66 (6th Cir. 2011)
(Sutton, J., concurring in part) (concluding that, because the minimum coverage provision
is constitutional in several of its applications, the plaintiffs' facial challenge had to fail (citing United States v. Salerno, 481 U.S. 739, 745 (1987))).
24. See Florida ex rel. Bondi v. U.S. Dep't of Health & Human Servs., 780 F. Supp. 2d
1256, 1299-1305 (N.D. Fla. 2011) (concluding that the individual mandate and remaining
provisions are inexplicably bound and therefore the mandate was not severable), aff'd in
part and rev'd in part, 648 F.3d 1235 (11th Cir. 2011).
25. See Liberty Univ., Inc. v. Geithner, No. 10 2347, F.3d _, 2011 WL 3962915,
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In short, the legal complexities are numerous and substantial,
wholly independent of the case's significance as a matter of public
policy or partisan politics. Popular interest is not the only reason
the Court took the remarkable step of setting aside three days for
oral argument.
II. BROADER CONSIDERATIONS

As the Justices consider the ACA's constitutionality this
spring, they undoubtedly will grapple with these doctrinal puzzles. By all indications, the current members of the Court are sincerely committed to the contemporary norms of judicial practice,
and thus take the intricacies of constitutional doctrine quite seriously." While their decisions are hardly immune from political
pressures, there is little reason to think that the Court's decision
will be "political" in the crudest sense-a blunt expression of the
Justices' personal policy preferences."
At the same time, the Justices are sophisticated players. They
understand that, in the broader drama of American constitutional
development, their roles go beyond the mere rationalization of
black letter law. In a case of this magnitude-economically, politically, and perhaps historically-they cannot help but be affected
by some broader considerations, matters that lie outside the specific doctrinal frames within which the case is being argued by
the parties and their amici.

at *4-5 (4th Cir. Sept. 8, 2011) (explaining that the Anti-Injunction Act divests federal
courts of their subject-matter jurisdiction and resolution of the case therefore turned on
whether the plaintiffs suit seeks to restrain the collection or assessment of any tax); Virginia ex rel. Cuccinelli, 656 F.3d at 270-73 (dismissing the case for lack of subject-matter
jurisdiction because Virginia failed to establish standing).
26. The one partial exception may be Justice Thomas, who seems less bound by the
doctrine of stare decisis than most judges. See, e.g., United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549,
602 (1995) (Thomas, J., concurring) (arguing that the Supreme Court should "modify" its
post-1937 Commerce Clause jurisprudence); see also Stephen B. Presser, Touting Thomas:
The Truth About America's Most Maligned Justice, LEGAL AFF., Jan.-Feb. 2005, at 68, 68
(quoting Justice Scalia as stating that Justice Thomas "doesn't believe in stare decisis, period"); Lincoln Caplan, Clarence Thomas's Brand of Judicial Logic, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 22,
2011, at SR10 (explaining that "Thomas's brand of originalism means substituting his
personal views of the Constitution for those of earlier courts").

27. See generally Bradley W. Joondeph, The Many Meanings of "Politics"in Judicial
Decision Making, 77 U.M.K.C. L. REV. 347 (2008) (discussing the various ways in which
judicial decisions are shaped by political forces without being "political" in this crudest
sense).
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Some of these considerations-external political forces with the
potential to shape the Court's deliberations-appear to have been
settled already. First, though the American public remains
somewhat confused about what the ACA actually does, it is clear
that the Act is not especially popular.28 A majority of Americans
seem to view the ACA unfavorably, and they seem particularly
hostile to the minimum coverage provision. 29 A recent poll conducted by the Associated Press and the National Constitution
Center found that an astounding 82% of respondents believe that
"[t]he Federal Government should not have the power to require
all Americans to buy health insurance."o Broad-based popular
support for the ACA would have made it more difficult for the
Court to invalidate the Act. But such support has not materialized.
Second, since the enactment of the ACA, the political climate
has turned against President Obama and the Democratic Party.
Of course, Obama remains the President, and the Democrats continue to hold a majority in the Senate. Moreover, political fortunes can change quickly; things might look quite different by the
time the Court hands down its decision. But the President's approval ratings have declined substantially since his inauguration," and the Democrats were trounced by the Republicans in

28. For example, a poll conducted by the Washington Post and ABC News between
September 29, 2011, and October 2, 2011, found that 43% of Americans would be more
likely to vote for a presidential candidate, if the candidate "[wiants to repeal [the] new
health care law," while only 29% would be less likely to vote for that candidate. Washington Post-ABC Poll, WASH. POST, http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-srv/politics/polls/post
abcpoll_100211.html (last visited Feb. 24, 2012).
29. See CNN Poll: Majority Oppose Individual Mandate, CNNPOLITICS (June 9, 2011
12:17 PM), http://politicalticker.blogs.cnn.com/2011/06/09/162714/ (showing 54% opposition to mandate versus 44% support of mandate);

HENRY J. KAISER FAMILY FOUND.,

KAISER POLLS, KAISER HEALTH TRACKING POLL: FEBRUARY 2011 1, 3 (2011) (indicating
that 48% view the ACA unfavorably, 85% of whom favor repealing the mandate; 67% oppose the mandate). But see HENRY J. KAISER FAMILY FOUND., KAISER POLLS, KAISER
HEALTH TRACKING POLL: SEPTEMBER 2011, at 4 (2011) (showing that 43% view the ACA
unfavorably while 41% view it favorably; yet, "more than half (52%) want Congress to
keep the law as is (19%) or expand it (33%), while fewer than four in ten (37%) want it repealed and replaced with a Republican-sponsored alternative (16%) or repealed outright
(21%)").
30. GFK ROPER PUB. AFFAIRS & CORP. COMMC'NS, ASSOCIATED PRESS, THE APNATIONAL CONSTITUTION CENTER POLL: AUGUST 2011, at 4 (2011).
31. A Gallup poll for November 7 through November 13, 2011, found the President's
approval rating to stand at 41%, which is down significantly from its high of 69% in January 2009, and his term average of 50%. Barack Obama Presidential Job Approval,
GALLUP, http://www.gallup.com/poll/116479/barack-obama-presidential-job-approval.aspx
(last visited Feb. 24, 2012).
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the 2010 midterm elections." Thus, were the Court to invalidate
the ACA, the Justices would not face a wall of united political opposition. Make no mistake, a decision striking down the ACA
would still be intensely controversial, probably as controversial as
any Supreme Court decision since Bush v. Gore." But the Court
would not be threatened institutionally the way it might have
been were the Democrats firmly in control of both elected branches. These two political facts-that the individual mandate is unpopular, and that the national government is politically fractured-afford the Justices ample breathing space to reach the
constitutional result they sincerely prefer."
At the same time, several other questions-ones apt to influence the Court's decision-remain unresolved. It is to these questions that I now turn.
III. FIVE QUESTIONS

In my view, there are five open questions that will determine
whether the Supreme Court upholds or invalidates the ACA.
Some are jurisprudential, while some are purely extralegal. What
they share in common is that they extend beyond the doctrinal
puzzles highlighted above. By their nature, these questions lack
correct answers, and it is unclear how the Justices will respond to
them. But my goal here is not to offer my own answers or to predict the Court's. Instead, my aim is merely to identify the deeper,
institutional concerns that will shape the Court's decision making. For, rather than the doctrine driving the outcome, it is the

32. See Peter Baker, Tide Turns, Starkly, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 3, 2010, at Al. Republicans gained sixty-three seats in the House of Representatives and six seats in the Senate,
and six governorships. See Chris Cillizza, Who Had the Worst Year in Washington? Michael Steele, Who had the Worst Year in Washington? Michael Steele, WASH. POST, Dec. 19,
2010, at Bl.
33. 531 U.S. 98 (2000) (refusing to order a manual recount of votes in the 2000 presidential election).

34. See Thomas M. Keck, Party Politicsor JudicialIndependence? The Regime Politics
Literature Hits the Law Schools, 32 L. & SOC. INQUIRY 511, 517 (2007) ("[T]he governing
[national] coalition is so often divided on important matters that the [Jiustices will have
multiple acceptable alternatives in most cases."); see also Keith E. Whittington, "Interpose

Your Friendly Hand": Political Supports for the Exercise of JudicialReview by the United
States Supreme Court, 99 AM. POL. SCl. REV. 583, 594 (2005) (stating the judiciary may be
willing and able to act because they are insulated from the competing pressures faced by
political leaders).
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Justices' responses to these underlying questions that will likely
determine their answers to the doctrinal puzzles.
A. Is This a Case in Which JudicialIntervention Is Appropriate?
For the past seventy-five years, the Supreme Court's conception of its role in our constitutional system has been formed in reaction to the Lochner era and its demise." The persistent, existential question for the Justices has been this: When, exactly, is
the Court justified in overriding the majoritarian preferences of
the People, as expressed through their elected representatives?
This is the so-called "counter-majoritarian difficulty" that has
preoccupied constitutional lawyers for nearly a century." The
general rule since 1937, at least in the realm of economic and
commercial regulation, has been deference to the political process. 7 As the Justices have often recognized, "[w]hen this Court is
asked to invalidate a statutory provision that has been approved
by both Houses of Congress and signed by the President, particularly an Act of Congress that confronts a deeply vexing national
problem, it should only do so for the most compelling constitutional reasons."" On the other hand, more exacting scrutiny is
appropriate in defense of those constitutional values unlikely to
be vindicated through ordinary politics-for instance, to protect
the rights of unpopular speakers, to prevent discrimination
against discrete and insular minorities, or to uphold fundamental
principles that the elected branches are apt to slight or ignore."
Into which category does this case fall? Is this an instance in
which the various sides in the debate are well representedwhere the issue is highly salient, and the politicians' positions
have determined (and are likely to determine) the results of elec-

35. See Barry Friedman, The Birth of an Academic Obsession: The History of the
CountermajoritarianDifficulty, PartFive, 112 YALE L.J. 153, 217 (2002).
36. The most famous articulation of the problem is found in The Least Dangerous
Branch.ALEXANDER M. BICKEL, THE LEAST DANGEROUS BRANCH: THE SUPREME COURT AT
THE BAR OF POLITICS 16-23 (1962). See generally Friedman, supra note 35, at 162 (stating
that ever since Franklin Roosevelt appointed enough Justices to the Court to change its
politics to the left of the political spectrum, liberal legal academics have struggled to justify judicial review).
37. See id. at 222-23.
38. Clinton v. City of New York, 524 U.S. 417, 447 n.42 (1998) (Stevens, J., concurring
in judgment) (quoting Bowsher v. Synar, 478 U.S. 714, 736 (1986)).
39. See generally United States v. Carolene Prods. Co., 304 U.S. 144, 152 n.4 (1938);
JOHN HART ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST (1980).
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tions, such that the political process can be trusted to devise a
constitutionally satisfactory answer? Is this essentially a case
where the losers in a fiercely fought political debate have turned
to the courts seeking a second bite at the apple? Or instead, is
this a case in which only the Court can safeguard our deepest
constitutional commitments against the opportunistic encroachment of the elected branches? Is this a place where the Court is
constitutionally obligated to step in and draw a line-even an arbitrary one-because the government has failed to articulate a
meaningful "limiting principle," and upholding the ACA would effectively mean that Congress's powers are limitless?
B. Are the States "SeparatelyIncompetent" to Enact Health Care
Reform?
A second consideration involves the broader purposes of Article
I, and the creation story of Congress's legislative powers in particular. As the recent scholarship of Jack Balkin, Robert Cooter,
and Neil Siegel reminds us, the enumeration of powers in Article
I, Section 8 has its roots (at least to some degree) in Resolution VI
of the Virginia Plan, the document prepared by the Virginia delegation to the Constitutional Convention (specifically, James Madison and Edmund Randolph)."o The Virginia delegation introduced
its plan to the Convention on May 29, 1787, and the plan's sixth
resolution proposed that the "National Legislature" be vested
with the power "to legislate in all cases to which the separate
States are incompetent, or in which the harmony of the United
States may be interrupted by the exercise of individual Legislation."" The Convention modified this language over the next six
weeks, but only slightly. On July 17, 1787, the Convention approved, by a margin of eight states to two, a proposal to grant
Congress the authority "to legislate in all cases for the general interests of the Union, and also in those to which the States are
separately incompetent, or in which the harmony of the United
States may be interrupted by the exercise of individual legislation."" This provision was then referred to the Committee of De40. Jack M. Balkin, Commerce, 109 MICH. L. REV. 1, 8-10 (2010); Robert D. Cooter &
Neil S. Siegel, Collective Action Federalism: A General Theory of Article 1, Section 8, 63
STAN. L. REV. 115, 130 (2010).
41. 1 THE RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787, at 21 (Max Farrand ed.,

rev. ed. 1966); see Balkin, supra note 40, at 8-9.
42.

2 THE RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787, at 21 (Max Farrand ed.,
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tail, which proceeded to draft what would become Article I, Section 8-the specific enumeration of Congress's discrete legislative
powers." There remains a lively academic debate as to what this
history implies: What should we infer from the Framers' decision
to enumerate these powers seriatim, rather than to retain the
more amorphous phrasing approved by the Convention before referring the matter to the Committee of Detail?" But there is little
doubt that, at least in the minds of several Framers, a catalytic
spirit behind Article I (and the adoption of the Constitution more
generally) was to empower Congress to solve those problems that,
owing to coordination difficulties and spillover effects, state governments were incapable of addressing on their own.
In the context of the ACA, then, the relevant question is twofold. First, is health care reform a matter on which the states are
"separately incompetent"?" Are the problems of inefficiency and
inequity that currently plague the system inherently interstate in
nature, with coordination problems and spillover effects, such
that a state-by-state approach is bound to fail?46 Second, if the
states are indeed "separately incompetent" in this regard, is such
incompetence constitutionally relevant? In more practical terms,
would the Justices be uncomfortable with placing health care reform (or at least a version that builds on the private insurance
market and thus includes some form of an individual mandate) in
a constitutional "no man's land"-beyond Congress's authority,
yet also beyond the states' practical capacities? Or instead, would
they be untroubled concluding that the ACA is constitutionally
ultra vires, no matter the uncertain, difficult-to-predict policy
consequences?

rev. ed. 1966); see Balkin, supra note 40, at 9-10.
43. See Balkin, supranote 40, at 10.
44. See Kurt T. Lash, ' esolution VI'- The Virginia Plan and Authority to Resolve
"CollectiveAction Problems" Under Article I, Section 8, at 7-11 (Ill. Pub. L. & Legal Theory
Research, Working Paper No. 10-40, 2011).
45. Balkin, supranote 40, at 6.
46. See Akhil Reed Amar, The Lawfulness of Health-CareReform, YALE LJ. ONLINE
(forthcoming 2012) (manuscript at 23-24), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1856506;
Balkin, supra note 40, at 6, 11-13, 46; see also Neil Siegel, Free Riding on Benevolence:
Collective Action Federalism and the Minimum Coverage Provision, 75 LAW & CONTEMP.
PROBS. (forthcoming 2012) (manuscript at 42-45, 47, 54-56), available at http://ssrn.
com/abstract=1843228.
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C. Should the GreaterPower Inform the Assessment of a Lesser
One?
The consensus among constitutional lawyers is that, under
well-established precedent, a complete government take-over of
the American health care financing system-a tax-and-spend, automatic-enrollment, Medicare-for-all scheme-would be perfectly
constitutional." The Supreme Court's 1937 decision in Helvering
v. Davis, which rejected a constitutional challenge to the Social
Security Act," foreordains this result, as does the entrenched understanding of Congress's authority to tax and spend for the general welfare. The ACA is more modest in its aims. Instead of creating something akin to a single-payer system, the ACA builds on
the existing private insurance market, subsidizing greater participation in that market by employers and individuals, and imposing a host of new rules intended to cure some of its imperfections.
For example, the Act prohibits health plans from engaging in
medical underwriting or excluding coverage for pre-existing conditions.4 9 In general terms, the ACA seeks to preserve and improve the existing private insurance market, rather than replace
it with a government-run system.
Of course, there are hundreds of places in constitutional law
that the government's greater power does not imply the lesser. To
name just a few: the state can punish all "fighting words," but it
cannot punish only those that "arouse[s] anger, alarm or resentment in others on the basis of race, color, creed, religion or gen47.

See, e.g., Randy E. Barnett, Carmack Waterhouse Professor of Legal Theory,

Georgetown Univ. Law Cntr., Our Pending National Debate: Is Health Care Reform Constitutional, AALS Hot Topic Panel Question & Answer Session (Jan. 7, 2011) in 62
MERCER L. REV. 605, 660 (2010) (stating that "if Medicare is constitutional, then Medicare
for everyone is constitutional," and noting that that he did not think "there is any question
under existing doctrine" that Medicare is constitutional).
48. 301 U.S. 619, 645-46 (1937).
49. Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, 42 U.S.C. § 300gg-11(a)(1) (Supp. IV
2010) (setting no lifetime or annual limits); Id. § 300gg-12 (prohibition on rescissions); Id.
§ 300gg-15 (development and use of uniform explanation of coverage documents and
standardized definitions); Id. § 300gg-16 (prohibition on salary-based discrimination); Id.
§ 300gg-3 (prohibition of preexisting condition exclusions); Id. § 300gg-4 (prohibition of
discrimination against individual participants and beneficiaries based on health status);
Id. § 300gg-7 (prohibition on excessive waiting periods); 42 U.S.C. § 18061 (Supp. IV 2010)
(transitional reinsurance program for individual and small group markets in each State);
Id. §§ 18062-63 (establishment of risk corridors for plans in individual and small group
markets and risk adjustment); Id. §§ 18071, 18081 (establishing refundable tax credits for
premium assistance and reduced cost-sharing for individuals enrolling in qualified health
plans).
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der."" A state can entirely eliminate its courts of appeal, but it
cannot create such courts on the condition that litigants seeking
an appeal (including indigent criminal defendants) pay a fee for
their trial transcripts." The government has no obligation to provide individuals with all sorts of benefits (such as cash welfare
payments, food stamps, or health insurance), but once it does, it
cannot withdraw those benefits without affording beneficiaries
some measure of due process." And an individual has no constitutional right to serve as a public school teacher, but a school district cannot fire a teacher for expressing her views on a matter of
public concern, at least when her speech does not interfere with
the school's operations." In other words, the government's exercise of a purportedly "lesser" power can often be invalid, no matter the constitutionality of a "greater" assertion of the same authority.
In many of these circumstances, though, the constitutional
problem lies in the risk of unequal or arbitrary treatment-for instance, that affluent criminal defendants will be treated more favorably than those who are indigent, or that speakers with popular messages will be entitled to speak freely while unpopular
views will be suppressed. By contrast, many of the constitutional
objections to the ACA concern the size and scope of the governmental power being exercised. 4 Indeed, it is the breadth of the
federal government's authority contemplated by the ACA to
which many of the Act's challengers most strenuously object. 5
It might therefore strike some of the Justices as ironic that an
approach to health care reform granting the federal government
substantially more authority would be perfectly constitutional,
but that the ACA's less ambitious approach could be invalid-and
precisely because it claims too much power for the federal gov-

50. See R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, 505 U.S. 377, 380, 391 (1992) (quoting ST. PAUL,
MINN., LEGIS. CODE § 292.02 (1990)) (internal quotation marks omitted).
51. See Griffin v. Illinois, 351 U.S. 12, 18 (1956) (citing McKane v. Durston, 153 U.S.
684, 687-88 (1894)).
52. See Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254, 261 (1970) (citing Kelly v. Wyman, 294 F.
Supp. 893, 961 (S.D.N.Y. 1968)).
53. See Pickering v. Bd. of Educ., 391 U.S. 563, 574-75 (1968).
54. See Brief in Response for Private Respondents at 1, U.S. Dep't of Health & Human
Servs. v. Florida, No. 11-398 (11th Cir. Oct. 14, 2011) ("[T]he ACA's mandate to purchase
an unwanted commercial product is an unprecedented and unbounded exercise of federal
authority.").
55. Id.
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ernment. The question for the Court, then, is whether this matters. Should the constitutionality of a Medicare-for-all scheme inform the Justices' appraisal of the ACA's more incremental approach? Or are the constitutional issues raised by the two types of
reform wholly incommensurate? Is the real problem with the
ACA not so much the amount of power being exercised, but the
type of power it claims-the means Congress seeks to employ? Alternatively, might some of the Justices be thinking several steps
(and years) ahead-and might they conclude that invalidating the
ACA will only make the eventual adoption of a single-payer-type,
Medicare-for-all program all the more likely?
D. What is at Stake for the Court?
This case is the most partisan, ideologically charged dispute to
reach the Court since Bush v. Gore." Despite the intense controversy that surrounded the Justices' intervention in the 2000 presidential election, the Court seemed to survive that trauma relatively unscathed, without any measurable damage to its diffuse
support from the American public." Its approval rating with the
American public remained essentially unchanged." Recent polling, however, suggests that the public's approval of the Court has
slipped." Might the nation's tolerance for the appearance of partisanship at the Court be analogous to that for bee stings: the venom is harmless up to a point, but toxic once it exceeds a certain
threshold? More generally, how will the Court's concern for its
own institutional legitimacy-its very practical need to maintain
its appearance as an arbiter of constitutional principle rather
than of partisan politics-affect the Justices' deliberations?o To

56. 531 U.S. 98, 111 (2000).
57. Gallup polling of whether Americans approved or disapproved of the way the Supreme Court was handling its job was essentially unaffected by the Court's decision in
Bush v. Gore. Its approval rating was 62% in August and September 2000, 59% in January
2001, and 62% in June 2001. Supreme Court, GALLUP, http://www.gallup.com/poll/4732/
Supreme-Court.aspx (last visited Feb. 24, 2012).
58. See id.
59. A recent Gallup poll found that the Supreme Court's approval rating among Americans had dipped to 46%, which was down 5 points from 2010 and 15 points from 2009. See
Jeffrey M. Jones, Supreme Court Approval Rating Dips to 46%, GALLUP (Oct. 3, 2011),
http://www.gallup.com/poll/149906/supreme-court-approval-rating-dips.aspx.
60. Cf. Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 865-66 (1992) ("The
Court must take care to speak and act in ways that allow people to accept its decisions on
the terms the Court claims for them, as grounded truly in principle, not as compromises
with social and political pressures having, as such, no bearing on the principled choices
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what extent might the Justices feel impelled to avoid a 5-4 decision, especially if its division is along predictable partisan lines?
Might the pressure to avoid such a result be particularly acute if
the Court, at roughly the same time, decides any other highprofile, politically charged cases-such as Arizona v. United
States, which concerns Arizona's controversial law regulating undocumented immigrants"-with the same 5-4 split?
E. What is at Stake for the Chief Justice?
From his first day on the job, John Roberts has seemed keenly
interested in his legacy as Chief Justice.62 This will be the biggest
case to date to reach the Court on his watch, and it might ultimately be the biggest decision of his tenure. How will that affect
the Chief Justice's thinking? Will he see this decision as an opportunity to demonstrate, in a way every American would understand, that the Court is truly above partisan politics-that his
lasting legacy is a deep and abiding commitment to "judicial modesty," even at the expense of his own ideological inclinations?" Or
will he instead see this as a case where the Justices must take a
potentially heroic stand in defense of the Constitution's structural
principles, no matter the reputational consequences-to him or to
the Court?64
IV. END GAME
To be clear, my claim is not that each of the Justices will consciously grapple with all of these questions (though I am confident some Justices will be thinking about some of them). Again,

that the Court is obliged to make. Thus, the Court's legitimacy depends on making legally
principled decisions under circumstances in which their principled character is sufficiently
plausible to be accepted by the Nation.").
61. See United States v. Arizona, 641 F.3d 339, 343 (9th Cir. 2011); Petition for Writ
of Certiorari at 3, Arizona v. United States, No. 11-182 (Aug. 10, 2011).
62. See, e.g., Jeffrey Rosen, Roberts's Rules, ATLANTIC MONTHLY, Jan.-Feb. 2007, at
104.

63. Cf. Confirmation Hearing on the Nomination of John G. Roberts, Jr. To Be Chief
Justice of the United States: Hearing Before the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 109th Cong.
158 (2005) (statement of John G. Roberts, nominee to be Chief Justice of the United
States) ("I think that general approach results in a modest approach to judging which is
good for the legal system as a whole. I don't think the courts should have a dominant role
in society and stressing society's problems.").
64. See id.; Rosen, supra note 62.
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the current Court seems quite conscious of its role in our constitutional system, a role that requires the Justices to engage in a
distinct, judicial form of constitutional analysis. Thus, they surely
will engage with the myriad doctrinal questions presented, and
will reach a result that reflects their sincere views of the law.
Their conscious decision making will not be predominantly "political" or extra-legal.
At the same time, we should not lose sight of the broader plane
on which the Supreme Court operates, particularly in deciding
cases of this nature. On that plane, history shows that it is typically these external, institutional, or political considerations that
drive the Court's conclusions. What tends to matter is not so
much how the Justices solve the technical, doctrinal puzzles, but
the broader questions posed-questions that are logically prior to
the legal questions presented. Identifying these considerations
hardly tells us what the Court is likely to do with the ACA. But
perhaps it moves us closer to understanding the reasons for the
Court's decision.
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